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 ALD-085       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2324 
___________ 
 
ROBERT HANKINS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; SHIRLEY MOORE-
SMEAL, Acting Commissioner of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; MARIROSA LAMAS, 
Superintendent at SCI Rockview; ROBERT MARSH, Deputy Superintendent; JEFFERY 
HORTON, Deputy Superintendent; TIM MILLER, Program Manager; WILLIAM 
WILLIAMS, (Ted) Medical Director; DANIEL FOX; AMY NIXON; BRADLEY 
NEWTON; JEFFREY WITHERITE; MICHAEL BELL, Grievance Officer; DORINA 
VARNER; KURT GRANLUND; BRIAN THOMPSON, Deputy Supt. at SCI Rockview; 
JEFFREY RACKOVAN; GEORGE SNEDEKER; JULIE PENSIERO/KOLTAY; 
JEREMY TIPTON; JOHN GRICE; JOHN GRAHAM; SHARON CLARK; STEWART 
BOONE; FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY; BEATRICE RIVELLO; BUREAU OF 
HEALTH CARE SERVICES; JOHN KNIGHT; JANE DOES Nurses at SCI Rockview 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00953) 
District Judge Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 17, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2016) 
2 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Robert Hankins (“Hankins”) appeals from the judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights 
case.  As the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
decision of the District Court. 
I. 
 Hankins is a state prisoner currently housed at SCI-Huntingdon and previously 
housed at SCI-Rockview.  During his time at SCI-Rockview, Hankins was repeatedly 
placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and on a restricted list due to his conduct.  
Hankins filed an amended civil rights complaint against members of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (“D.O.C.”),1 naming various SCI-Rockview administrators 
and staff as defendants.  For brevity’s sake, we will refer to these defendants as the 
“D.O.C. Defendants.”   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Defendants Bureau of Healthcare Services; D.O.C. Secretary John Wetzel; Deputy 
Secretary Shirley Moore Smeal; Regional Staff Assistants Brad Newton and Jeffrey 
Witherite; Grievance Officers Michael Bell and Dorina Varner; and Julie Pensiero/Koltay 
and Jeremy Tipton were dismissed over the course of motions practice.  Hankins also 
named a set of Jane Doe nurses, but their identities were never clarified and so were 
dismissed. 
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 Hankins raised numerous claims, some of which were dismissed by the District 
Court on motion of the D.O.C. Defendants, and others which were dismissed over the 
course of discovery.  The District Court allowed several of Hankins’s claims to go 
forward, namely that: regulations unconstitutionally prevented him from buying and/or 
receiving outside publications while housed in the RHU; he was subjected to retaliation 
for pursuing his legal remedies; and his incoming mail was interfered with.  The D.O.C. 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted.  Hankins 
appeals from that order.2 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment. 3  See Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record “shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  When making this analysis, a 
                                              
2 This case was initially listed for possible dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect.  The 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment was entered on March 27, 2015.   
Hankins filed a document on April 17, 2015, called “Objections,” and then filed his 
notice of appeal on May 18, 2015.  The District Court construed the “Objections” as a 
motion for reconsideration and denied it on November 2, 2015.  Because the document 
was not a clear motion for reconsideration, Hankins’s notice of appeal appeared untimely, 
but was, in fact, timely.  Hankins did not appeal from the District Court’s November 
order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).  Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over 
the order granting summary judgment, but not the order denying reconsideration. 
4 
 
district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable 
inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986).  A mere “scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]’s 
position will be insufficient” to create a genuine issue of fact.  Id. at 252.  The non-
moving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a 
material fact.”  See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).  The 
non-moving party cannot rest on his complaint, but must point to affidavits, depositions, 
interrogatory answers, and/or any admissions in establishing that there are material, 
disputed facts.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 
A. First Amendment Claim 
 The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s First 
Amendment claim.  Where a prison regulation imposes restrictions on an inmate’s 
constitutional rights, that regulation is valid only if “it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  Turner sets forth 
four factors for courts to consider when determining if a prison regulation is in fact 
reasonable: (1) a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate, 
neutral governmental interest; (2) any alternative means of exercising the infringed right; 
(3) the burden that the accommodation imposes on prison resources; and (4) any readily 
available alternatives existing that would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights with 
                                                                                                                                                  
3 We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a 
substantial issue.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
5 
 
little cost to legitimate penological interests.  See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 
(3d Cir. 2012).  The prison has the burden of demonstrating the first factor, and if it meets 
that burden, we consider the three other factors.  Id.  Ultimately, the inmate bears the 
burden of showing that the regulation is unreasonable.  Id. 
 Hankins specifically alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated by 
SCI-Rockview’s restrictive publication policies.  The first policy stated that books could 
not be purchased on the behalf of RHU prisoners, and the second required newspapers to 
be exchanged on a one-for-one basis.  These policies were changed after Hankins filed 
the current lawsuit. 
 While the defendants changed the policies, they defended the initial, more 
restrictive policies as legitimate under Turner, and cited Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 
(2006), and Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), to support their 
position.  Both cases upheld a more restrictive publication policy than what Hankins 
challenged.  Regarding the first Turner factor (and citing Iseley), the D.O.C. defendants 
argued that there were legitimate, neutral governmental interests regarding the 
publication regulations: reducing the risk of flammable materials; limiting an inmate’s 
ability to hide or trade prison contraband; limiting available resources for potential 
weapons; and providing a form of non-violent behavior modification.  They submitted 
disciplinary reports documenting Hankins’s many outbursts and threats in support of 
these arguments.  They then pointed to alternative means for Hankins and other prisoners 
to exercise their rights under the second Turner factor.  They noted that prisoners 
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received publications from within the prison; were allowed to keep a copy of a religious 
text; received materials from pre-existing subscriptions; were allowed to renew 
newspaper subscriptions; and were allowed to have one newspaper at a time.  Regarding 
the third Turner factor, the defendants argued that the burden that Hankins’s 
accommodation request posed a danger to correctional staff and inmates.  They provided 
evidence documenting his history of threatening staff, throwing bodily fluids on staff, 
assaulting staff, and screaming obscenities.  The defendants did not squarely discuss the 
fourth Turner factor.  However, the District Court stated that the defendants had 
demonstrated that “there was an absence of available ready alternatives.” 
 Hankins did not submit evidence that established a genuine dispute over any 
material fact.  Hankins argued that Beard supported his position, but he read the case 
incorrectly.  In Beard, the Supreme Court upheld a blanket ban of publications - a more 
severe policy than what Hankins challenged here.  See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525-26.  
Hankins also contended, without any support, that because a prior prison and the next 
prison he was housed at gave him legal exemptions, that SCI-Rockview should have 
given him the same privilege.  Ultimately, we give state prison officials deference in 
making such decisions.  See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  As such, the defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment. 
B. Retaliation Claims 
 The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s retaliation 
claims because he did not provide evidence to establish a causal link between the exercise 
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of his rights and the disciplinary actions taken against him and did not show that his mail 
was tampered with.  In order to succeed in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish 
three elements.  First, he must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally 
protected.  Then, he must show retaliatory action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights[.]”  Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 
191 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Finally, he 
must establish a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the 
adverse action taken against him.  Id.  In the prison context, the plaintiff has the “initial 
burden of proving that his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or 
motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him.”  Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. 
 Hankins alleged that he was retaliated against because he exercised his right to 
pursue legal remedies.  He stated that: SCI-Rockview medical staff ignored his requests 
to trim his toe-nails, for sensitive toothpaste, and for replacement eyeglasses; he was 
denied permission to purchase or receive religious and non-religious publications; and he 
was prevented from receiving incoming mail and newspapers.  Hankins also alleged that 
he was prevented from accessing his legal property and was improperly placed on total 
movement restriction.  
 In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants most explicitly pointed to 
record evidence regarding causation.  First, regarding Hankins’s medical retaliation 
claims, they noted his medical requests, while delayed, were in fact complied with.  The 
delays were due to D.O.C. bureaucratic requirements and restrictions.  Next, regarding 
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his publications retaliation claim, the defendants noted that the publication policies at 
issue existed before Hankins was transferred to SCI-Rockview, and so that applying the 
policies to him were not retaliatory.  Next, the defendants argued that Hankins did not 
adequately define his mail retaliation claim, but all the same, pointed to record evidence 
showing that he received at least six letters from an attorney and letters from his sister, 
and that he has been able to successfully access the courts with his filings.  Regarding his 
legal property retaliation claim, the defendants noted that under D.O.C. policy, Hankins 
had access on a monthly basis to his legal property, and that in practice, his requests to 
access that property was granted.  Finally, regarding his restricted movement claim, the 
defendants pointed to the fact that Hankins had a history of activities restrictions to 
establish that placing him on total movement restriction was not unwarranted.   
 Despite all of the evidence he provided, Hankins did not establish a genuine 
dispute over any material fact.  He did not point to any facts actually raising a genuine 
issue of fact regarding retaliatory motives on the part of the defendants.  Accordingly, the 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
decision. 
